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Trinity, Time, and Sacrament:
Christ’s Eucharistic Presence in the Theology of
Robert W. Jenson
Jason M. Curtis
University of Edinburgh
In recent years the doctrine of God has undergone significant discussion and revision.
Emerging from this phenomenon as a concept inextricably linked with Trinity is the
question of time. That is, given the incarnation and the biblical evidence that God not
only transcends creaturely limitations but also enters into the created order, how are we
to envision God’s relation to time? Broadly speaking, excepting the latest developments
in this field, the Christian options for divine temporality have been either timelessness
or some version of divine process where God limits himself in ways similar to humans. 1
Robert W. Jenson has joined a growing community of theologians (such as Barth and
Pannenberg) seeking a third way that affirms divine temporality without abandoning
many of the traditional divine perfections. 2 Yet, as will become obvious below, since
divine temporality is so foundational it brings with it consequences that may prove
problematical for other theological doctrines.
So it is with the question of Christ’s presence to the world—a matter united with
Trinity and time, as well as Eucharist; hence its theological import should immediately
seize us. Jenson offers an intriguing model of divine temporality that is not without its
advantages, yet it pushes in directions regarding Eucharist where even he may not wish
I am aware that there is debate as to whether the fathers and medievalists actually meant what we
today understand as timelessness, but the fact remains that the present state of affairs leaves us with
these options. Therefore, for the purposes of this article, I will avoid that question.
2 Robert W. Jenson, Systematic Theology, vol. 1: The Triune God (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1997); and Systematic Theology, vol. 2: The Works of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Hereafter
referred to as ST followed by volume and page number.
1
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to go. This essay attempts to demonstrate Jenson’s connection between his trinitarian
ontology and the Eucharist, to identify any shortcomings, and offer a modest proposal
that, in concert with Jenson, may improve theology’s chances of ridding itself of what
he has identified as its arch nemesis—divine timelessness.
Trinity and Time
Theology’s role in the gospel proclamation must inevitably address pressing questions
concerning the historical event of Jesus Christ, and Jenson understands the gospel’s
identity of the God who raised Jesus from the dead as “an initial and determining
theme of theology” (ST I, 42). Therefore, he approaches this theme by asking how and
in what contexts God is identified, and for Jenson the only legitimate path to such a
discovery is within scripture. Both testaments give an answer that is contextual and
temporally conditioned, yet not contradictory. Jenson demonstrates that, for Israel, God
was whoever rescued them from Egypt, and in the New Testament God is “whoever
raised Jesus from the dead” (ST I, 44). “Israel’s and the church’s God is thus identified
by specific temporal actions and is known within certain temporal communities by
personal names and identifying descriptions thereby provided” (ST I, 46). Therefore,
the God of Israel and the church can be identified only by contingent events. But Jenson
presses us further.
Because God had made certain promises to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, namely,
that there would be an Israel, Israel existed in them prior to the Exodus. While Exodus
remains the answer to the question of God’s identity, this point demonstrates that he is
identifiable based on the reality of his temporal promises that came to fruition in
historical contingencies. God is “identified by certain temporal events but is
apprehended as himself temporally identifiable” (ST I, 49). The indisputable evidence of
this identity, for Jenson, is the death of Jesus. That is, his death does not render the
Trinity as a “binity” during Friday and Sunday morning, nor does it obliterate the
incarnation. The only answer is to say that the Trinity is always the Trinity and those
temporal events must somehow belong to his deity (ST I, 49). Thus, God is not only
identified by the events of Exodus and Resurrection, but is identified with those
temporal events (ST I, 59). If God was only identifiable by the events, then we might
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conclude that God is wearing a mask of some sort and is ontologically different than he
appears in time and space, i.e., the incarnation and resurrection.
Since Jenson believes that God is really identifiable by and with the Exodus and
Resurrection, then it naturally follows to ask what sort of being he is, and his answer is
that God’s hypostatic being is constituted in dramatic coherence (ST I, 63). He finds no
problem (unlike Aristotle) in saying that God’s identification with historical
contingency is an “ontological perfection,” not a deficit. God is identical with himself in
and because of the “eventful actuality,” i.e. his identity with history (ST I, 64). The
striking feature of dramatic coherence (or, life within history) is that it must be complete
before one can truly identify the personal. Since God is united with the history of his
creatures, he too “can have no identity except as he meets the temporal end toward
which creatures live” (ST I, 65). To put it another way, God’s very being and identity
are united to history in such a way that it is not merely established in eternity past who
he will be and continually persists in that decision, 3 but rather his eternal identity is only
seen or anticipated from the end of the story.
If the triune God is identified by and with temporality and particular temporal
events (Exodus and Resurrection) in the biblical narrative, then how do God and time
relate? In Jenson’s terminology, “the chief diagnostic question about religion,” is “What
eternity does it posit?” (ST I, 55). According to Jenson, the Greeks, in an effort toward
security of existence over against time’s fleetingness, defined eternity in terms of
timelessness. 4 Since humanity cannot embrace our past, present, and future giving us
the coherence of life that we naturally desire, the ancient Greeks projected that ability
onto God and therefore defined deity in terms of persistence or immutability. Jenson
asserts that while the early church did not simply assimilate Hellenism into its theology,
it nonetheless failed to rid itself of certain debilitating features, the pinnacle of which is
the notion of divine timelessness.
Augustine, who is for Jenson the prime example of the Christian failure in this
regard, rejected this “eventful” or “narrative” differentiation in God due to his superior
commitment to Platonic theology, that is, God must be simple. Temporal distinctions,
3 For a fuller discussion on this see, Robert Jenson, God After God: The God of the Past and the God of the
Future, Seen in the Work of Karl Barth (Indianapolis: The Bobbs‐Merrill Company, 1969), 8‐23. Hereafter
referred to as GAG, followed by page number.
4 On this see his, Triune Identity (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), 57‐64; ST I, 95‐104; GAG, 10‐13.
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in Augustine’s view, are impossible (ST I, 111), and Jenson believes Augustine is forced
to say that there is no difference at all among the agencies of the persons, because God
is simple and cannot have temporal differentiation. By stripping away the connection
between self‐differentiation of the Trinity and God’s work within time he is saying that
what we read about in the biblical narrative about self‐differentiation in created time
does not in reality apply to God. Jenson summarizes Augustine: “the three identities
not only equally possess the one ousia but identically possess it, so that the
differentiating relations between them are irrelevant to their being God” (ST I, 112).
Effectively, Augustine is rejecting a God that can be “contaminated” by temporality. 5
Over against this Jenson judges the Cappadocian trinitarian formula as
summarized by Gregory of Nyssa to be superior: “All action that impacts the creature
from God…begins with the Father and is actual through the Son and is perfected in the
Holy Spirit” (Quoted in ST I, 110). This is to say that any action of the triune God
toward his creation is not divided among modes or actors in the Godhead, but is
attributed directly to “a perfect mutuality of the agencies of Father, Son, and Spirit” (ST
I, 110). Yet, according to Jenson, it is impossible to uphold the Cappadocian formula
while one works within a timeless model that prohibits such eventful differentiation,
and a consequence of rejecting his proposed correction is that it does not give a clear
picture as to our history, but rather disconnects God from our history. Our history is
dependent upon the life of God with his people precisely because our history is a result
of the Father’s originating, the Spirit’s perfecting, and the Son’s mediation of the two
(ST I, 114).
It is this formula—the mediation of the Son—that is of central concern for
Jenson’s trinitarian ontology. If his project is an establishment and explication of a
truly Christian doctrine of God as the starting and ending point of all Christian
theology, the key to such a doctrine is Christology. He states: “A truly Christian
doctrine of God is a description of Jesus Christ. It says that this man shall come and

I must emphasize that this is Jenson’s exposition of Augustine and it is not without controversy.
For our purposes, whatever it is that Augustine intended to say, a) Jenson reads him this way and I am
interested in what Jenson believes to be the case, and b) contemporary defenders of atemporality appeal
to Augustine, Boethius, and others. Therefore, timelessness in the modern sense remains the antagonist,
whether or not one can legitimately appeal to them.
5
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every knee shall bow. It says that he is the one who has hidden behind the mask of the
absent ‘God.’” 6
Primally, Jenson firmly rejects a Logos asarkos—a sort of god behind God that
bears little ontological resemblance to the human Jesus. Based on Jesus’ words in John
8:58 that “Before Abraham was, I am,” Jenson believes that he eliminates the possibility
of some sort of divine entity in his preexistence that is not identical with the Jesus of the
Gospels. Hence, Jesus the Son is not a Logos asarkos in his preexistence, but is precisely
Jesus the Son even prior to birth. Nevertheless, he is born at a point in time, so we
must account for his eternal state prior to that event. Jenson says that the narrative
pattern for Jesus’ life is that of “being going to be born.” Prior to Bethlehem there is not
an unincarnate state, but a pattern of movement within the incarnation event and the
triune life of God (ST I, 141).
Herein one discovers a clear and longstanding divergence between the Reformed
and Lutheran traditions—Jenson siding with the latter. Jenson sees the strong
Creator/creature distinction in Reformed teaching (which, applied to Christology, is the
“one person in two natures” formula) as pushing toward the timeless entity devoid of
Jesus’ history that is characteristic of “religion.” Alternatively, Jenson is so keen to
relate the one hypostasis of the Son with the Father that Gunton claims he is guilty of
downplaying “the necessary otherness of Jesus and the Father by overstressing their
identity.” 7 When this takes place Gunton believes that Jenson runs the risk of
subsuming Jesus’ humanity under divinity (Gunton, 85), which is a problem that
persists in Jenson’s theology, as I hope to demonstrate in the discussion on Eucharist.
That is, Jesus’ humanity may indeed be subsumed under Eucharist. Nevertheless,
Jenson’s aim in this rejection of the Logos asarkos is to be able to state unequivocally that
God is as he reveals himself to be in Jesus Christ; therefore, that God is present within
our history. This is not to say that the Reformed tradition wants anything less, and
Gunton is clear in his critique of Jenson that he does not want a sharp division between

Jenson, “Proclamation without Metaphysics,” Dialog 1 (1962): 22‐29; quoted in David S. Yeago,
“Catholicity, Nihilism, and the God of the Gospel: Reflections on the Theology of Robert W. Jenson,”
Dialog 31 (1992): 18.
7 Colin Gunton, “Creation and Mediation in the Theology of Robert W. Jenson,” in Colin E. Gunton,
ed., Trinity, Time, and Church: A Response to the Theology of Robert W. Jenson (Grand Rapids: William B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000), 85.
6
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his humanity and deity, spawning a regression to the fifth century error of identifying
some of Jesus’ acts as divine and others as human. Likewise, Gunton does not wish to
extract God from history so that one easily slips into deism. But a doctrine rejecting the
Logos asarkos must answer the inevitable complexities that arise with it, 8 and one such
difficulty is the manner in which God can be temporal yet overcome time’s
contingencies. Unquestionably for Jenson, Jesus suffers all the evils perpetrated against
him, dies on Golgotha, and the Father raises him from the dead by the power of the
Spirit, thus “impassibility” is not a serious option.
So and not otherwise the Father triumphs over suffering…The Father and the
Spirit take the suffering of the creature who the Son is into the triune life and
bring from it the final good of that creature, all other creatures, and of God. So
and not otherwise the true God transcends suffering—whatever unknowably
might have been (ST I, 144).
Jesus’ action, i.e. suffering, is unequivocally God’s action, but this does not subject
Trinity to created time’s contingencies because of God’s victory over that suffering in the
resurrection by the power of the Spirit. How can this be so? Jenson’s answer seems to
be nothing more than, “That is what God does—he overcomes.” He states:
[O]nce it is clear that there truly is only one individual person who is the Christ,
who lives as one of the Trinity and one of us, and that he is personal precisely as
one of us, then to say that he as creature is our savior—or that he as creature
exercises any divine power—is simply to say that he plays his role in the triune
life and does not need to abstract from his human actuality to do so (ST I, 144‐
45).
In sum, Jenson perceives a timeless Trinity as the roadblock to identifying God as he is
and how he interacts with the world. I agree with Jenson’s effort in this regard and
believe that the contemporary discussion of divine temporality must take on a more
For a critique of Jenson’s position on the Logos asarkos see, Paul D. Molnar, Freedom and the Doctrine
of the Immanent Trinity: In Dialogue with Karl Barth and Contemporary Theology (London: T&T Clark Ltd.,
2002), 70‐75; Gunton, TTC, pp. 86‐93.
8
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central role in the doctrine of God. But if the chief diagnostic question about religion is,
“What eternity does it posit?” and Jenson believes God’s being is constituted in
dramatic coherence without being overcome by time’s contingencies, then exactly how
is God’s eternity related to time, and what does Jenson refer to when he talks of time?
To get at what it means to say “God’s being,” Jenson follows Gregory of Nyssa
and expands upon Aquinas (ST I, 212‐14). First, Gregory does not believe “God” and
ousia are equivalent. If this were the case, says Gregory, when one asserts three
instances of the divine ousia, then one quickly slides into tritheism. Therefore, when we
say God the term “refers to the mutual action of the identities’ divine ‘energies,’ to the
perichoretic triune life” (ST I, 214). “God,” then, is never a reference to a form in and of
itself, but is a life‐in‐action, “a going‐on, a sequentially palpable event, like a kiss or a
train wreck” (ST I, 214).
Second, the persons of the Godhead live this divine life, “other than and prior to
the fact that God is” (ST I, 215). That is, to say that “God has being” means we do not
look for something behind the mutual, active life of the Father, Son, and Spirit. The
communal life of the three persons precedes (in a logical sense) any notion of being.
Third, Gregory, according to Jenson, believes the only way to characterize divine
being is “infinite” or “limitlessness.” Jenson understands Gregory to express in a
profoundly anti‐Greek fashion that God is not infinite in the sense that he “extends
indefinitely, but because no temporal activity can keep up with the activity that he is”
(ST I, 216). In the same manner as we earlier described God’s passibility, it is not that
boundaries do not exist for God, but that he overcomes the boundaries. Hence, Jenson
declares God’s being should be described as temporal infinity. This term, in Jenson’s
understanding, demonstrates God’s self‐liberation from temporal contingencies,
without extracting him from history. Therefore, while one might believe that divine
temporality necessarily leads one to a god in process or one lacking sovereign lordship,
Jenson believes that it is precisely this “overcoming” of boundaries that demonstrates
God is Lord, a concept that is not unlike the sinlessness of Jesus.
To some extent, Jenson is building upon Barth’s understanding of divine eternity
as “pure duration.” That is, God does not lose aspects of his life into the past, nor does
God not yet have parts of his existence that lie in the future. “Any eternity is some
transcendence of temporal limits, but the biblical God’s eternity is not the simple
contradiction of time. What he transcends is not the having of beginnings and goals
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and reconciliations, but any personal limitation in having them” (ST I, 217). Yet Jenson
claims to go beyond Barth by explicitly emphasizing the temporal aspect of God’s being
just in the Father and Spirit. According to him, we might look at the Father as the origin
of the divine life (“whence”), the Spirit as the goal (“whither”), and the Son as the
present. If origin and goal (past and present) hold together in the divine life so that
God does not lose any “time” or duration, then they must be “asymmetrical,” and this
fact preserves a collapse into timelessness. Furthermore, Father and Spirit (source and
goal) unite in the Son. “Thus the way in which the whence and whither of the divine
life are one, the way in which the triune God is eternal, is by the events of Jesus’ death
and resurrection” (ST I, 219). Yet, we must ask exactly what it means to say that the
relationship between Father and Spirit is asymmetrical, especially if they coinhere in the
Son’s present? Clearly Jenson is reaching for some way to avoid timelessness yet
maintain perichoresis, but one consequence of this is an overemphasis on the temporal
location of the Son. It is an overemphasis in the sense that what becomes crucial for
theology is to locate Jesus, not the Spirit of Jesus, but the male Jew who walked the
earth. Or, to say it another way, the “asymmetry” of Jenson’s trinitarian ontology
pushes toward an “isolated present” of the Son, to the unintended exclusion of Father
and Spirit. And this is precisely the tendency in Jenson’s version of Eucharist. Even so,
the perichoretic side of the ontology is manifested at various points.
According to Jenson, the Spirit brings the future Kingdom which Jesus came to
establish. The Spirit so rests on Jesus that God’s infinity is apprehended in the
“inexhaustibility” of Jesus’ work that continues undeterred. In spite of the
boundedness of Jesus’ life the Kingdom possibilities are not so constrained because the
Spirit takes up Jesus’ work and brings them from the goal of fulfilled Kingdom. As to
the Father he “intends himself in the Son,” and this loving consciousness on the part of
the Father demonstrates his infinity. That is, as creatures our consciousness can only
identify itself within a finite object, hence it is finite. The Father identifies himself in the
Son, who in turn identifies himself, not only with the Father, but with those outside the
Godhead (ST I, 220). Therefore, Jenson believes, “the temporal infinity that opens
before us and so embraces us as the triune God’s eternity is the inexhaustibility of one
event. That event is the appropriation of all other events by the love actual as Jesus of
Nazareth” (ST I, 221). Therefore, the Son’s identity as “present with us” is the fulcrum
of the divine temporality, even though within that temporality he demonstrates its
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infinity, or its overcoming. Because of the emphasis laid on the Spirit’s continuation of
Christ’s work this may appear to mitigate the asymmetrical aspect of Trinity; however,
it does not alleviate the pressure of Jesus’ temporal location since, as we will see, Jenson
does not carry this line of thought through to Eucharist, and because it is still unclear
how he might say the Spirit is both “future” and “present.” The asymmetry of the
divine identities and the stress on the temporal location of the Son also suggests Jenson
must emphasize sacrament over Word and Spirit. How can Christ’s presence in the
sacrament in any way be real apart from the empowerment of Word and Spirit? Jenson
has admitted that the work of Jesus is “inexhaustible” because of the Spirit, thus, why
not sacrament, as well? At least part of his answer seems to lie in the temporal
arrangement of the divine identities.
What does Jenson assert concerning the nature of time? According to Jenson,
one version bequeathed to the West was from Augustine who created a paradox for
himself when he determined that if our present always remained so, it would be
eternity. Hence, even the present must lack temporality and can only function as a
geometrical point in the transition from past to future. This leads to time as
“nothingness,” but since he is a Christian, Augustine cannot accept this. Thus, the soul
becomes the place where past, present and future are there for humans, yet not in the
same fashion as it is for God. That is, the past and future simply cannot exist for the
finite soul, while they do for God. But Augustine does not want to be pressed into this
solution, so he identifies memory and expectation as the places where they are real as a
distentio of the soul. Jenson calls this Augustinian version of time “the inner horizon of
human experience” (ST II, 30‐31). Augustine seems to view time as a stretched‐out line
within the creature.
For Jenson, another version of time handed down in Western thought is
Aristotelian: “time is the metric of external physical movement provided by a standard
of such movement.” That is, time is something external to us built into the fabric of the
universe. Yet, according to Jenson, this model does not do justice to the experiential
question that we have in relation to time, that is, how it is we are “transcendentally”
shaped by it (ST II, 32). So, what contemporary interpretations exist of our time?
Classic relativity theory describes the world in which we live and move, in which there
are causes and effects. Jenson proposes that we might understand this theory as “real
time,” so to speak, since it relates to the external world and is irreducibly tensed.
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Quantum mechanics supposes that there is an “imaginary time” that is detached from
our experience of time. “Two moments of this time…are like points on a map, so that,
which way the arrow points depends on from which side the two moments are viewed;
this time is indeed a ‘fourth dimension’ indistinguishable from the other three” (ST II,
33). As Jenson mentions in a footnote, these two categories might roughly correspond
to A and B‐theories of time (i.e. the dynamic [A] and stasis [B] theories). 9 While not
entering into the philosophical debate as to their merits Jenson does offer a judgment
for theology’s role here: theology must side with A‐theorists.
Nevertheless, the question remains as to how Jenson reconciles “real” and
“imaginary” time. He states:
Surely our primal intuition of time is that it must possess the characters of both
Augustine’s “time” and Aristotle’s “time,” of both “real” time and “imaginary”
time. Time is precisely the horizon of experience, with both nouns demanding full
weight. A resolution suggests itself: that time is indeed, a la Augustine, the
“distention” of a personal reality, and that just so it provides creatures with an
external metric of created events. That is: the “stretching out” that makes time is an
extension not of finite consciousness but of an infinite enveloping consciousness (ST
II, 34).
For Jenson, creation is that act of taking time or “making room” for us. Hence, creation
provides the matrix of our living in him and in this sense time is external to us. Yet, as
we move within creation we are participating and experiencing this matrix in a sense
that is more integral to our being—as Augustine would say (ST II, 34). We experience
time in the way we do because God created us to experience him, hence time must be
his being and experience, as it is ours (thus, the priority of A‐theory). Jenson believes
Augustine’s understanding of divine simplicity blinded him to God’s complexity as a
being of temporal infinity, but instead he projected those complexities onto the human
soul. Against this, Jenson asserts, we should understand God as a “life among persons.
And therefore creation’s temporality is not awkwardly related to God’s eternity, and its
sequentiality imposes no strain on its participation in being” (ST II, 35).

The references could be many, but for a good analysis of the theories see, Alan G. Padgett, God,
Eternity and the Nature of Time (London: Macmillan, 1992).
9
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The effect, according to Jenson, is that we must affirm a “past and future” in
God’s very being, which is identical to the self‐differentiated Father and Spirit. Still, nothing
in the divine being is subject to time’s fleetingness and God does not gain from the
future something that he does not already have. Indeed, the Spirit is the future, hence
what or who could give to the Godhead? Further, this triune structure to past, present,
and future is prior to our time and holds it together. “It indeed better suits the gospel’s
God to speak of ‘God’s time’ and ‘created time,’ taking ‘time’ as an analogous concept,
than to think of God as not having time and then resort to such circumlocutions as
Barth’s ‘sheer duration’” (ST II, 35).
This last quote is confusing. It seems that at the very end of an argument whose
aim is to free theology from a timeless God, Jenson casts us right back into the throws of
ambiguity by positing an analogous concept of time between God and humanity. He
seems to have labored to demonstrate that earthly, real, A‐series time is within God’s
being, who enables such time to exist, yet by referring to God’s time and our time as
“analogous” does he not undercut what he has just stated? Further, it is this very point
for which Jenson criticized Barth, asserting that he has not truly avoided timelessness
because of his use of analogy (GAG, 154). On this scheme God is not tainted by the
vicissitudes of created temporality if he exists in his own time, but that is precisely the
idea that Jenson’s entire project attempts to zealously avoid—escaping created time to
find the God of eternity. At the end of the day, I wonder whether Jenson’s model of
divine asymmetry/perichoresis is really that different from Barth.
In sum, Jenson argues that God’s being is temporal and the ground for our
temporality, and his participation within it is not only fact, but is necessary. However,
for Jenson, God remains Lord over created time in two ways: the self‐differentiated
persons of the Trinity embrace envelope time and history—Father as past, Spirit as
future, and the Son as historical present; and God overcomes the limitations of time,
principally demonstrated in the resurrection of Jesus Christ. But how is the Son the
“present” in this time if he is not here? Jenson has already established that there is no
Logos asarkos, hence talking about the “Son as historical present” is referring to the
human, historical Jesus. Therefore, in order for Jenson’s view of Trinity and time to
hold together, Jesus must be present in a sense that enables us to locate him temporally.
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Eucharist
“Christ is personally the second identity of God, and the totus Christus is Christ
with the church; therefore the church is not in the same way an opus ad extra as is the
creation, even when it is perfected in God” (ST II, 167). And again, “the church is the
body of Christ for the world and for her members, in that she is constituted a
community by the verbal and ‘visible’ presence to her of that same body of Christ. The
body of Christ is at once his sacramental presence within the church’s assembly, to
make that assembly a community, and is the church‐community herself for the world
and her members” (ST II, 168). Hence, for Jenson, Christ’s presence on this earth is the
objective reality of the church around the bread and the wine, to which Christ himself has
pointed and said, “This is my body.” And it is not a presence of simile or metaphor, but
is ontologically so, though not in a biological sense (ST II, 212). Thus, just as the Father
turns to the Son for his self‐identification, the Son now turns to the church and
Eucharist in like manner for his self‐identification. 10 The Supper must be objectively
Christ’s body, the same one that hung on the tree and was born of Mary, and must be
more than a simple movement toward “inward awareness of the risen Christ and to a
deeper feeling of communion with him…” (ST II, 214). Jenson arrives at this conclusion
by means of several arguments relating to body and temporality. We will ask: 1) What
is sacramental embodiment and why is embodiment necessary? 2) How does Jenson
unite temporality with embodiment?
Embodiment is defined by availability to other persons. The church is the body of
Christ in the sense that “she is the object in the world, an available something as which
Christ is there to be addressed and grasped” (ST II, 213). The Eucharist is truly
communion because it is such between Christ and us; thus, in celebrating the Eucharist,
the church is realizing what it truly is—a communion in Christ. And such a
communion is nothing less than the gospel proclaimed with visible words. Words are
communion of persons, or the presence of persons with each other. That is the essence
of the sacraments: the self‐communication of Christ in an address between persons. 11
Robert W. Jenson, “The Body of God’s Presence: A Trinitarian Theory,” in Richard W. A.
McKinney, ed., Creation, Christ and Culture: Studies in Honor of T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1976),
90.
11 Robert W. Jenson, Visible Words: The Interpretation and Practice of Christian Sacraments (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1978), 19. Hereafter referred to as VW, followed by page number.
10

32

Journal for Christian Theological Research 10 (2005) 21‐38

Therefore, Jenson contends, in order for there to be an objective communication
between persons there must be embodiment, for without it, “such a presence—and it is
our salvation that it never quite occurs—would be ‘pure’ spirit, the nightmare dream of
philosophers and the religious. Such a presence would be disembodied spirit…” (VW,
21). Relying on an argument from subject‐object distinction, Jenson asserts that in any
encounter one must not only be object, but also subject, else the one who is object is
enslaved by the subject. Dynamic relation or reciprocity hangs on the possibility of
response as a subject and not merely an object. A disembodied presence would exclude
me from being subject because there would not be availability of the other as object.
Thus, that disembodied presence would signal my bondage, and if we insert God into
the equation, it would mean destruction. Jenson states:
Were Christ not embodied in his community, were his presence there merely to
and in thought and feeling, he would be the community’s destruction, however
fond the thoughts and feelings; and were he not embodied for the world in his
community, his presence in the world would be the world’s damnation.
Further, Jenson claims that this sacramental communication demands embodiment
because if one is present only by language and not objective embodiment, then the
words are open to change, being governed only by the rules of grammar. However, if
the words are embodied and objective, then they are irreplaceable “in their givenness as
objects in the world” (VW, 23). Therefore, the (visible) words of the conversation of the
Supper are thrown into disrepute if the elements are not objectively body, for as such
they would be replaceable.
All of this underscores for Jenson that for one to be present and available to
another there must be embodiment; else that person and that communication are both
unidentifiable and enslaving. So, if the Christian community is going to address God
and others, especially in terms of gospel proclamation, there must be embodiment of all
participants. “The word in which God…communicates himself must be an embodied
word, a word ‘with’ some visible reality, a grant of divine objectivity. We must be able
to see and touch what we are to apprehend from God; religion cannot do without
sacrament” (VW, 28). And this “seeing” and “touching” of God’s body is the church
partaking the elements of bread and wine in the Supper. For this to be the case, yet
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remain a non‐biological reality, it is only necessary, according to Jenson, that Christ
understand himself in this way, thus determining its reality (ST II, 214). As established
in the previous section of this essay God identifies himself within the temporal reality
that is Jesus, but now that Jesus is resurrected and not walking this earth, Jenson
believes that God turns to himself in the bread and wine, for that is precisely the place
where Jesus places his identity. Hence, one perceives the gravity of the doctrine for
Jenson: “If the gospel is indeed gospel, its speaking is Jesus’ presence as himself: in the
same body that Mary bore. Therefore, we must assert: the body Pilate hanged, and the
embodiment of gospel‐speaking among us, the ensemble of the gospel’s sacramental
reality, are one thing” (VW, 44). But the question is, how? The answer is unclear. What is
clear, at least to me, is that Jenson’s view of divine ontology pushes toward a biological
presence of Christ, which elevates sacrament and is, in effect, detracting from the
priority of the Word and the actualizing power of the Spirit.
Assessment
Jenson’s stress on divine temporality and its manifestation in the bread and wine
(and the church) is an example of a tendency to stretch the comfort zone of Western
theology, yet also to pull back just at the point of no return. For this reason it is easy to
wonder exactly what it is that Jenson intends; thus it is not surprising that capable,
proven scholars often come to opposite conclusions regarding his work (not unlike his
theological forerunner, Barth!). I believe that this is the situation meeting us here. It
may very well be that Jenson’s theological impulse is one long overdue and we must
carefully listen and heed his voice. Although, as I am certain he would admit, in
listening we must identify the potential impediments and be willing to redirect that
impulse when necessary. As far as the reality of Christ’s presence in the Supper, we are
not at odds. Yet, I am also convinced that his trinitarian ontology, combined with more
explicit language of bodily presence lends itself strongly to a biological presence, and
may only be a small step away. Still, there is much in Jenson to commend itself to us.
Jenson has helpfully documented weaknesses in a theological tradition that relies
so heavily upon the religion of Mediterranean antiquity, not the least of which is divine
timelessness. Yet, the genius of Jenson’s project is his recognition of the reasons behind
the tradition’s doctrine, in combination with an ability to free it from such predicaments
without subjecting God to time’s contingencies, in particular, overcoming death and the
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future. Certainly his commitment to the biblical narrative as the place where God’s
identifiability is illuminated has much to do with the success of his program.
Further, one cannot help but be impressed by the straightforward simplicity of
Jensonʹs assertion that given the humanity and embodiment of Jesus Christ, and given
his identification of the second person of the Trinity, Christian theology must give an
account of God’s embodiment and temporality. Most theologians are also unsatisfied
with merely positing the God‐Man in all his temporal humanity while simultaneously
affirming God as Spirit, untainted by temporality, but Jenson is correct that this is
essentially the state of affairs, at least among popular theology (“The Body of God’s
Presence,” 87). If we are to affirm Christian trinitarianism, then we must affirm divine
temporality—at least in some form. Jenson’s stress upon the necessity of God’s
embodiment is equally important for many reasons, but particularly in light of normal
religion’s quest for the god behind time and matter.
Clearly, for Jenson, true time must involve embodied availability. Trinity
embraces time not as an eternal present for which God never has temporal movement,
but rather in that the Father is past, the Spirit future, and both find their unity in the Son
who is present. Thus, Jesus must be temporally present and must be bodily so in order
for his presence to be objectively real. To be temporally present, Jesus must bodily
occupy our space, else he is not available to us, and if he is not present, then he is not
God (“The Body of God’s Presence,” 82). Therefore, Jenson’s doctrine of Eucharist is
directly dependent upon Trinity, who envelopes time—our time.
However, we have hinted that by equating past, present, and future with Father,
Son, and Spirit, Jenson presses Eucharist in an unhelpful direction. First, Jenson does
not clearly demonstrate that and how Trinity is united with time as we know it—A‐
series time. He unceasingly creates the impression that such an arrangement is the only
alternative to timelessness. Yet, precisely at the point where we would expect an
explicit articulation on how Trinity and A‐series time come together, he equivocates
and asserts some analogical version of “God’s time” and “our time.” 12
Second, by pressing toward this temporal arrangement, Jenson implies a
biological presence, despite a desire to avoid such a conclusion. It is the gendered Jew
that is bodily present in the Eucharist, according to Jenson, and to be bodily present
Jenson’s response might be to explicate his version of divine futurity; yet I remain unconvinced
that that solves the analogical dilemma with which he charges Barth.
12
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within our time seems to imply the biological body of Jesus. This is the natural reading
of Jenson’s position, and if he intends some sort of spiritual presence he does so without
resorting to such language.
Third, the temporal distinction between Father, Son, and Spirit endangers the
possibility of action for each divine identity in the other temporal sphere, conflating all
talk of divine action into the Son. So, in our particular case, does the Spirit play any role
in the Eucharistic meal if the only requirement is that Jesus declares himself to be bodily
present? 13
In my estimation what is lacking in Jenson is a strong pneumatological activity in
the Eucharist meal. If the Spirit is indeed future, is it not possible to say that in addition
to bringing in God’s eschatological kingdom, he also brings to our present the
eschatological presence of Christ? He has already given assent in this direction by
speaking of the inexhaustibility of Jesus’ work since it is taken up by the Spirit who
brings it from the future. Why not the reality of his presence in the bread and wine, as
well?
Indeed, it is the Spirit who is the proof that Jesus does not leave his children as
orphans, for Jesus’ own understanding of his presence with his disciples continued in
an unbroken, albeit different form because of the Spirit (Luke 24:49). He is really present
with us, though not in a way that we can reach out, grasp him, and embrace him in the
same manner as the disciples did. Furthermore, his Spirit even took the role of making
his presence real for his church to such an extent that this same embodied Jew of the
first century could himself claim to be with two or three gathered in his name (Matthew
18:19). In his pre‐resurrected state, it is difficult to imagine such a scenario on Jenson’s
account of embodiment and temporal presence. This consideration brings to the fore
the need for a stronger emphasis upon the role of the Spirit in bringing Christ’s
presence to us. It is not merely Christ who is present to us, and the tendency in Jenson
is to read “God with us” as exclusively pertaining to Christ. Clearly, the Spirit is with
us, too, and we detract from his person when the Spirit is marginalized in the worship
Again, I do not fundamentally disagree with Jenson’s assertion that Christ really is present in the
Eucharist and in the Church, though in the latter there is certainly a gap at the moment because of sin—a
gap that will eventually be closed. My disagreement with him is that his trinitarian ontology logically
leads us to a biological presence that marginalizes Word and Spirit, and he does little to mitigate that
inevitability short of merely denying it.
13
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of the Church, particular in the Eucharist. As Gunton writes, “Crucial here is an
important distinction: that the presence of Christ is not as but through the Spirit, who is
the mediator of both Christ’s presence and his (eschatological) otherness.” 14
Additionally, this pneumatological emphasis has the benefit of giving due
consideration to Jesus’ current eschatological mission as expressed in John 14:1‐4, 15‐20.
It appears as one of the great ironies of Jenson’s work that in seeking to affirm bodily
presence as Christ’s availability to the world, he may actually undermine Jesus’ body by
not giving proper weight to eschatological time, specifically, Christ’s ascension and
parousia. 15 The lack of space here prohibits a full discussion of the distinguishing
features of eschatological time and our present time, but the overriding issue is that in
the discussion of Christ’s presence and Eucharist one must not revert to timelessness or
created time as the location of the presence. Christ is in his own place that is near to us,
and this does not entail a falsification of the gospel, but rather takes seriously Christ’s
own proclamation concerning his bodily departure from our time and his presence in
eschatological time.
One final point needs to be made. In Jenson’s scheme the question of the Supper
always revolves around where Jesus is temporally located (and we must omit a
discussion on the turn from temporal language toward spatial language), thus
emphasizing the transformation of the elements. Indeed, the elements themselves take
on a priority that easily militates against the “sign” aspect of the sacrament, i.e., the
gospel Word. But if the Spirit is given its proper weight in this discussion, this question
fades, for we know that the Spirit can (and I say, does) make Christ present to us, but
can also lift the worshippers up into Christʹs presence. Hence, whether we understand
the Eucharist to be a moment where the Spirit lifts us to Christ or brings him to us, the
reality of his presence remains, and there is no need to wonder whether within the
elements we have a biological or non‐biological presence, for that cannot and does not

Colin E. Gunton, Father, Son and Holy Spirit: Toward a Fully Trinitarian Theology (London: T&T
Clark Ltd, 2003), 230.
15 Here I am indebted to Douglas Farrow, “Between the Rock and Hard Place: In Support of
(something like) a Reformed View of the Eucharist,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 3 (July,
2001), 167‐86. Whether this admittedly more Reformed view of Eucharist is a regression to timelessness
is an important question, but beyond the scope of this article.
14
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actualize the gospel. Sacrament is real presence, but is only so because of Word and
Spirit. Jenson’s reversal of this order may indeed follow from his trinitarian ontology.
Jenson’s trinitarian ontology and his view of Eucharist when pressed toward its
logical end could unintentionally exclude the ascended, coming‐again body, and in
doing so may fail to grant his humanity its proper place. Hence, eschatological time
governed by the Spirit should dictate our ideas of Christ’s temporal presence,
appreciating that the gospel is real not because we touch the bread and drink the wine
among the assembly, but because Jesus has ascended, sent his Spirit as his ongoing
presence with us, and promises to return—a promise that makes the Eucharist the
powerful reality that it is. As Dalferth has put it:
[The] Christian faith is not a set of beliefs about past events, but faith in a present
reality. The prime interest of Christian communication therefore is to help those
to whom it is addressed to develop a sense of the presence of God and to
discover how God is present and active in their own lives and world. The
Christian gospel is not a piece of information about the past, but a pointer to a
present reality that can and should be discerned by everyone. 16
We would add to this “pointer to a present reality” a pointer to a present reality that
will be consummated. It is because of the promise of a bodily return of Jesus that we take
seriously his temporal presence, and if the Spirit were not with us, neither Jesus’
present nor his future would be available to us.
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